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The goals of automated biosurveillance systems are to detect disease outbreaks early, while exhibiting few false positives. Evaluation
measures currently exist to estimate the expected detection time of biosurveillance systems. Researchers also have developed models that
estimate clinician detection of cases of outbreak diseases, which is a process known as clinical case ﬁnding. However, little research has
been done on estimating how well biosurveillance systems augment traditional outbreak detection that is carried out by clinicians. In this
paper, we introduce a general approach for doing so for non-endemic disease outbreaks, which are characteristic of bioterrorist induced
diseases, such as respiratory anthrax. We ﬁrst layout the basic framework, which makes minimal assumptions, and then we specialize it in
several ways. We illustrate the method using a Bayesian outbreak detection algorithm called PANDA, a model of clinician outbreak
detection, and simulated cases of a windborne anthrax release. This analysis derives a bound on how well we would expect PANDA
to augment clinician detection of an anthrax outbreak. The results support that such analyses are useful in assessing the extent to which
computer-based outbreak detection systems are expected to augment traditional clinician outbreak detection.
 2008 Published by Elsevier Inc.
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Electronic biosurveillance refers to the systematic collec-
tion and automated analysis of electronically available data
with the intent of detecting outbreaks of disease rapidly [1].
These electronic data can come from emergency depart-
ment visits, over-the-counter medication sales, ambulatory
care visit records, and other sources.
The traditional public health system relies heavily on cli-
nicians to report suspected cases of disease outbreaks. The
main reason for implementing a biosurveillance system is
to improve the timeliness of outbreak detection relative
to depending solely on clinicians to detect outbreaks.
Due to the lack of actual outbreaks of diseases under sur-
veillance, however, evaluations of improvement are scarce.1532-0464/$ - see front matter  2008 Published by Elsevier Inc.
doi:10.1016/j.jbi.2007.11.002
* Corresponding author.
E-mail address: shenyn@cbmi.pitt.edu (Y. Shen).Therefore, there exists considerable uncertainty as to
whether and how much a biosurveillance system would
improve the timeliness of detecting disease outbreaks, rela-
tive to traditional case detection by clinicians, which is
known as clinical case ﬁnding.
Automated biosurveillance systems and clinical case
ﬁnding are likely to exhibit diﬀerent behaviors in detecting
disease outbreaks. Consider, for example, an outdoor
release of anthrax spores by a bioterrorist. As a conse-
quence, suppose that early in the outbreak a modest num-
ber of respiratory anthrax cases appear in emergency
departments (EDs) that serve the area of the population
downwind of the point of anthrax release. These anthrax
cases might not be identiﬁed via case ﬁnding upon presen-
tation to the ED because they might be easily confused
with other respiratory diseases that are much more com-
mon. On the other hand, a biosurveillance system that
monitors the chief complaints of patients that visit all these
EDs may be able to detect an increase in respiratory cases
1 More generally, the model could be applied to estimate the detection
time of diagnosticians of any kind, including public health oﬃcials.
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may have a high positive predictive value for a windborne,
bioterrorist-induced outbreak disease. Such a situation
would favor early detection by the biosurveillance system,
relative to clinical case ﬁnding.
Conversely, consider a single patient who presents to an
EDwith a rash characteristic of smallpox. Suppose the chief
complaint is coded by the triage nurse as ‘‘rash’’. Such a case
might well be detected by an ED clinician, but would be unli-
kely to be detected by a biosurveillance system that is moni-
toring the chief complaints of patients that present to EDs in
the region. Such a situation clearly favors early detection by
clinical case ﬁnding, relative to computer-based detection.
Generalizing the examples just provided, automated
biosurveillance systems are expected to detect an outbreak
relatively early when (1) the outbreak cases present with
clinical features (typically symptoms and signs) that are
only weakly diagnostic in individual patients (i.e., have a
low positive predictive value for each such patient case),
but are strongly diagnostic when viewed as a spatio-tempo-
ral pattern in the population, and (2) such clinical features
are available in a timely manner in electronic form. Con-
versely, traditional outbreak detection by clinicians is likely
to do relatively well if early in the outbreak only a few
patient cases present with clinical features that have a high
positive predictive value for the outbreak disease. Since the
outbreak detection performance of biosurveillance systems
is likely to diﬀer from that of clinical case ﬁnding—at least
in some situations—there exists the potential for such com-
puter-based detection to complement clinical case ﬁnding.
In this paper we model how well automated biosurveil-
lance systems are expected to improve traditional clinical
case ﬁnding. We believe this is an informative perspective
from which to evaluate biosurveillance systems. In particu-
lar, the paper focuses on evaluating the detection of non-
endemic, bioterrorist-induced diseases, such as inhalational
anthrax.
2. Background
In evaluating biosurveillance systems, investigators have
used several measures of detection performance. Some
common performance measures include the direct report-
ing of sensitivity and false positive rates. Sensitivity (true
positive rate) estimates the chance that a future outbreak
will ever be detected. The false positive rate is the expected
number of false alerts of an outbreak per unit time; it is
sometimes called the false alert rate. Receiver operating
characteristic (ROC) curves, such as those presented by
Burkom [2], are commonly used summaries for assessing
the tradeoﬀ between sensitivity and false positive rates in
detecting disease outbreaks.
The ability to detect outbreaks in a timely manner is an
issue of central importance. Fawcett and Provost intro-
duced a framework for evaluating the performance of
activity monitoring algorithms in ﬁnancial transaction sys-
tems [3]. The Activity Monitoring Operating Characteristic(AMOC) curve that they deﬁned has become a useful and
popular method for assessing the performance of systems
that detect outbreaks of disease [4–6]. As it is typically
applied in evaluating biosurveillance systems, the AMOC
curve plots the expected time to detection (since the out-
break began) versus the false alert rate. As the threshold
used for detecting an outbreak decreases, the time to detec-
tion generally decreases, but the false alert rate generally
increases. Kleinman and Abrams describe additional mea-
sures for assessing biosurveillance performance [7].
The closest prior work to that reported here is by Bucke-
ridge et al. [8]. They compared the outbreak detection per-
formance between automated syndromic surveillance and
clinical case ﬁnding. In particular, they did so using a
cumulative sum computer algorithm and simulations that
model (1) inhalational anthrax outbreaks and (2) clinical
case ﬁnding performance of anthrax cases. Their results
include a report of the mean detection beneﬁt of using
the computer algorithm to augment clinical case ﬁnding
at a given level of speciﬁcity. We discuss their results in
more detail in Section 5.
The current paper diﬀers from Buckeridge et al. in that it
provides a general formulation in the form of an equation
for estimating disease outbreak detection time when an
automated biosurveillance system is augmenting tradi-
tional clinical case ﬁnding. In contrast, Buckeridge et al.
use stochastic simulation to investigate the extent to which
a biosurveillance system is expected to augment clinical
case detection in a particular outbreak scenario involving
inhalational anthrax. They do not provide a general formu-
lation of joint computer-clinician outbreak detection.3. Methodology
In this section we layout a general equation for measur-
ing joint detection performance when a biosurveillance sys-
tem is augmenting traditional clinical case ﬁnding. We then
specialize it in several ways under assumptions.
We assume that if the expected false alert rate of com-
puter-based outbreak detection and clinical case ﬁnding is
zero, then a computer generated alert and a clinical case
diagnosis will be treated identically in terms of the resulting
public health response. This assumption can be relaxed;
however, we believe it is useful to ﬁrst introduce a formu-
lation that incorporates this symmetry, which then can be
extended in future, to more complex models. The example
introduced in Section 4 assumes that clinical case ﬁnding
has a zero false positive rate, although we discuss there
how this assumption can be readily relaxed.
We now introduce a general model of clinician outbreak
detection. We believe that versions of this model can serve
as useful approximations for estimating the expected time
that clinicians1 will take to detect a particular type of out-
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a non-endemic disease in which the number of cases under
a non-outbreak condition is zero or nearly so. Many poten-
tial bioterrorist-induced diseases, such as inhalational
anthrax and smallpox, satisfy this assumption. For such
diseases, the identiﬁcation of a single case is suﬃcient to
indicate an outbreak of the disease.
Let time(i) be a function that maps patient case i to the
time at which that patient presented with outbreak disease
D to clinicians. Assume that patient cases with D are con-
secutively numbered from 1 toM, where case 1 denotes the
ﬁrst patient andM denotes the last patient to present to cli-
nicians with D during the outbreak. Let K denote back-
ground knowledge and information, which could include
clinician skills, clinician networks of interaction, and the
clinical ﬁndings of each patient.
Let P(si|K) designate the probability that case i would be
detected by a clinician at time si and no other cases would
be detected by clinicians on or before si. Thus, each of the
remaining M  1 cases either was not ever diagnosed as
having D or was diagnosed by clinicians as having D at a
time later than si.
Let U denote the greatest amount of time beyond which
it is not useful to detect the outbreak. Let P(U|K) repre-
sent the probability that clinicians never detect the out-
break at all by time U, which means that none of the M
cases are diagnosed as having D.
Now consider outbreak detection by the computer out-
break detection algorithm. Let r be a threshold such that if
the computer algorithm’s probability of an outbreak is
above r, then an alert is raised. For that threshold, there
will be some false alerting rate of the algorithm and some
time tr at which the algorithm’s outbreak probability is
expected to initially exceed r during an outbreak (or a sim-
ulated outbreak). If the algorithm’s probability never
exceeds r, then let tr = U. Many values of threshold r are
considered.
Eq. (1) expresses the expected joint detection time
(EJDT) for a given alerting threshold r. The ﬁrst term on
the right hand side is computer algorithm’s detection time,
assuming that clinicians never detect the outbreak on their
own (i.e., min(tr,U)), multiplied by the probability of that
situation occurring (i.e., P(U|K)). The sum in Eq. (1) con-
siders the situation in which clinicians do detect outbreak
disease D. Each possible case is considered as the possible
ﬁrst case in which clinicians detect D. The integral derives
the expected time to detect a given case i. The min function
within the integral captures the notion that we wish to rep-
resent the earliest detection of the case, regardless of
whether it was ﬁrst detected by the computer algorithm
(at time tr) or by clinicians (at time si).EJDTðrÞ ¼ minðtr;UÞPð U jKÞ
þ
XM
i¼1
Z U
si¼timeðiÞ
minðtr; siÞP ðsijKÞdsi ð1ÞEq. (1) is quite general. It makes no assumptions about
how the computer algorithm or the clinicians detect an out-
break, or the type of data that is used in doing so. For
example, Eq. (1) does not assume that the cases are inde-
pendent of each other. It also does not assume that clini-
cians work independently of each other in detecting an
outbreak disease.
It may be challenging to apply Eq. (1) directly in prac-
tice, however. Therefore, we next introduce specialized ver-
sions. If we assume that people with D are diagnosed
independently of each other, then we can represent the
probabilities P(si|K) and P(U|K) as a product of proba-
bilities. Let P(s|B(i)) denote the probability that patient
outbreak case i will be diagnosed as having D at time s,
given background knowledge and information B(i). For
example, B(i) would typically include the information that
case i was ﬁrst seen at time(i). It might also contain addi-
tional information, such as the type and severity of the
symptoms of patient case i, as well as information about
the particular clinician who cared for that patient.
With these assumptions, Eq. (1) can be specialized to
Eq. (2). In this equation, the ﬁrst term expresses the situa-
tion in which clinicians never detect the outbreak in a use-
ful amount of time. Each value of j in the sum expresses the
situation in which the jth case is detected and no cases are
detected before it.
EJDTðrÞ ¼ minðtr;UÞ 
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 !
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
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s00¼timeðzÞ
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 !
ds0 ð2Þ
To further simplify the modeling and analysis, in Eq. (3) we
assume that the background information B(i) only includes
the information that case i was ﬁrst seen at time(i).
EJDTðrÞ ¼ minðtr;UÞ 
YM
i¼1
1
Z U
s¼timeðiÞ
P ðsjtimeðiÞÞds
 !
þ
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If we model time as being discrete, we can convert the inte-
grals in Eq. (3) into sums.
4. An example application of the methodology
In this section, we describe an example application that
involves deriving an upper bound on the time required to
detect an outbreak of windborne inhalational anthrax.
We ﬁrst describe the model of clinician outbreak detection
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system we applied. We then give an overview of how we
simulated cases of patients with inhalational anthrax and
overlaid those cases onto background data of real cases
of patients who visited emergency departments during a
period when there were no known outbreaks of disease
occurring. Finally, we describe the results from applying
Eq. (3) to derive an upper bound on the expected time
required for clinicians and the outbreak detection system
(working in parallel) to detect a simulated outbreak of
windborne anthrax.
We derive an upper bound because it is more straight-
forward and conservative than modeling a point estimate.
Also, as a practical matter, if the upper bound turns out
to be low, it provides support that outbreak detection is
likely to be eﬀective. We emphasize, however, that the pur-
pose of this example is to illustrate a basic application of
Eq. (3), rather than focus on the speciﬁc details of the
example.
4.1. The model of clinician outbreak detection
Our model of clinician outbreak detection of anthrax
uses the model developed and described by Adamou,
et al. [9]. We assume that there are two ways in which a
patient infected with inhalational anthrax can be detected
as having the disease by a clinician. One is based on the
observation of characteristic signs on a chest X-ray, such
as mediastinal widening. The other is by the appearance
of a positive blood culture for Bacillus anthracis. If a diag-
nosis were made based on the chest X-ray, we assume it
would occur within 4 hours of the patient presenting to
the clinician. If it were made based on a blood culture,
we assume it would occur within 48 hours of presentation.
We modeled the probability of a chest X-ray (and alter-
natively a blood culture) leading to an outbreak disease
diagnosis as being sensitive to the time at which a patient
case presented to a clinician. Later cases are more likely
to be advanced, and thus more likely to be diagnosed.
Table 1 in the Appendix shows these probabilities, which
were derived from a model that was constructed by author
CA and author JND. Author JND is an infectious disease
specialist, who estimated the model’s parameters based on
the literature and his clinical beliefs [9].
We set the parameter U to be time(M) + 48, where
time(M) is the time (in hours) that the last patient case with
anthrax (from the simulation) presented to the ED. Beyond
this time, we assume detection would not occur, and even if
it did, it would be of little or no help to any patient who is
diagnosed so late. Before this time, we assume it is possible
that detection could occur and that it would beneﬁt the
treatment of a patient who has the outbreak disease.
Our model of clinician outbreak detection provides an
upper bound for two reasons. First, our infectious disease
specialist was more conﬁdent in estimating an upper bound
on detection time from chest X-rays and blood cultures
than in estimating a mean detection time or a lower boundon it. Second, Eq. (3) assumes that clinicians detect out-
breaks independently of each other. In reality, when out-
break cases would start to appear on a given clinic or
emergency department, clinicians would likely begin notic-
ing each other’s cases, and thus, their disease detection
behavior would no longer be independent. The assumption
of diagnostic independence yields an upper bound on clini-
cian detection performance. Since in this example we model
an upper bound on clinician performance, the EJDT will
also be an upper bound on joint computer and clinician
detection performance.
4.2. PANDA
We used PANDA (Population-wide ANomaly Detec-
tion and Assessment) as the outbreak detection algorithm
[4]. PANDA uses a spatio-temporal, multivariate Bayesian
approach to biosurveillance. In particular, a spatio-tempo-
ral, causal Bayesian network is used to model an outbreak
due to the windborne spread of anthrax. Each person in the
population being monitored for an outbreak is modeled
using a subnetwork. The primary clinical information
about each patient is whether he or she presented to the
ED with a respiratory chief complaint (e.g., a cough).
These subnetworks are connected through a common set
of nodes that represent the disease outbreak conditions,
such as the hypothesized location and time of release of
anthrax spores. Since the resulting Bayesian network
requires millions of nodes to model a medium-sized U.S.
metropolitan population, PANDA uses several optimiza-
tion methods to keep the model size manageable and the
inference time tractable.
4.3. Creating simulated datasets
We evaluated the joint detection performance of
PANDA and the clinician model on datasets produced
by overlaying simulated anthrax cases onto a background
of actual ED cases obtained from several hospitals in Alle-
gheny County, Pennsylvania. All personal identifying
information was removed from these actual ED cases.
The simulated cases of anthrax were produced by the
2004 version of the BARD simulator [10].
BARD uses a Gaussian plume model and weather con-
ditions to estimate the distribution of spore concentrations
over a geographic region. Based on the spore concentra-
tions in a given zip code, BARD uses a clinical model to
simulate the number of patients who will contract inhala-
tional anthrax over time. In particular, BARD produces
a list of anthrax cases, where each case consists of a date-
time ﬁeld and a zip code.
For our experiments, we applied the datasets generated
in [4] in order to compare the joint detection performance
(clinicians + PANDA) with the detection performance of
PANDA alone and the clinicians alone. These datasets
were produced by providing several parameters to the
BARD simulator, such as the weather conditions and
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anthrax release.
The generated datasets correspond to simulated releases
of anthrax at dosages 1.0 kg. We generated 96 datasets
(anthrax cases overlaid onto actual ED cases), each with
an unique combination of release date, wind direction, wind
speed, release location, release height, and quantity of
spores released. For each month in 2002, eight random
release times were selected for use by the simulator. Thus,
a total of 8 · 12 = 96 diﬀerent datasets were generated by
overlaying the anthrax cases produced by the simulator
onto a background of actual ED cases from 2001 to 2002 [4].4.4. Deriving the Expected Joint Detection Time (EJDT)
We applied Eq. (3) using each of the 96 datasets
described above. For the remainder of this paragraph, we
consider one of the 96 datasets. We combined cases in
the dataset (outbreak cases overlaid onto real cases) as
input to PANDA, and PANDA’s posterior probability of
an outbreak for the dataset was recorded in order to deter-
mine its detection time and false positive rate for various
probability detection thresholds. In particular, the detec-
tion time was the time from the ﬁrst anthrax case present-
ing to the ED until the threshold was crossed by the
posterior probability of anthrax that was output by
PANDA. The false positive rate was derived as FP/M,
where FP is the number of false positives that occurred
when PANDA monitored the real data during anMmonth
period before the simulated release. The value of M varied
in each of the 96 datasets.
We used the simulated anthrax cases in the dataset in
applying an instance of Eq. (3) to determine clinician detec-
tion. The clinician detection time was derived as the sum of
the presentation time of a patient with anthrax (relative to
the presentation time of the ﬁrst anthrax case) plus the time
required by the clinician to diagnose that case (if ever),
which we modeled as requiring either 4 hours (for a chest
X-ray based diagnosis) or 48 hours (for a blood-culture
based diagnosis) after presentation to the ED.
The above process of applying Eq. (3) was performed
using each of the 96 datasets. These datasets together pro-
duced a curve that plots the EJDT as a function of PAN-
DA’s false alert rate.24.5. Results
Fig. 1 shows the AMOC curves of an upper bound on
the expected time to detection (relative to the presenta-2 Since we assumed in this example that clinicians did not falsely
diagnose anyone as having anthrax, the clinicians did not contribute to the
false alert rate. If we wished to model clinicians as having a constant false
alert rate of q per month for diagnosing anthrax, we could simply add q to
the false alert rate (far) for PANDA, which would shift the EJDT versus
far plot to the right by q units. Since q seems negligible, we assumed it to
be 0 in the example here.tion time of the ﬁrst anthrax case) as a function of false
alert rate. The plot of the upper bound on clinician
expected detection time is a horizontal line at approxi-
mately 62 hours. The expected detection time of PANDA
alone is also shown. An upper bound on the joint detec-
tion time, EJDT, is slightly lower than the expected
detection time by PANDA. In particular, at zero false
alert per month, an upper bound on EJDT is 21.8 h
and the expected detection time by PANDA is 22.7 h,
which suggests that the joint detection time is expected
to be at least 54 minutes faster than PANDA’s detection
time. A point estimate of the mean clinician detection
time would be lower, and thus, the EJDT would be
lower as well.
We performed a sensitivity analysis in order to gain
additional insight regarding clinician and EJDT detec-
tion time. In particular, we assume that a patient with
inhalational anthrax, who presents to a clinician, would
with probability p be diagnosed upon presentation as
having anthrax. Under this model, Eq. (3) reduces to
Eq. (4).
EJDTðrÞ ¼ minðtr;UÞ  ð1 pÞM
þ
XM
j¼1
minðtr; timeðjÞÞ  p  ð1 pÞj1 ð4Þ
In Fig. 2, we plot the expected joint detection time at dif-
ferent levels of p, under the assumption that p is constant.
As p increases, EJDT decreases as expected. Speciﬁcally, if
p > 0.01 and the false alarm rate is zero per month, then
EJDT is less than 14.9 h. At this level of clinician detection
performance, the EJDT is more than 7 h sooner than using
PANDA alone. Also, interestingly, when p = 0.002 the
joint detection performance is very close to that shown in
Fig. 1.
As a second type of sensitivity analysis, we developed
a variation on the analysis plotted in Fig. 2. Let d denote
the number of cases required for clinicians to ﬁrst detect
the outbreak disease. We plot the expected joint detec-
tion time as a function of d in Fig. 3. This plot makes
no assumptions about individual clinician performance
in detecting a disease outbreak. For d less than 200
cases, the EJDT decreases substantially as d decreases,
and clinician detection contributes signiﬁcantly to the
joint detection performance. When d is more than 300
cases, the EJDT tends to remain at approximately
23.7 h when there is zero false alert rate per month.
These results suggests that PANDA contributes signiﬁ-
cantly to the joint detection performance when d is larger
than 200.
Furthermore, the number of cases d that yields the
joint performance shown in Fig. 1 is approximately 148
cases, which shows that clinician detection is on the cusp
of having a signiﬁcant impact on overall detection per-
formance of the joint computer-clinician detection
system.
05
10
15
20
25
30
0 4 8 10
False Alerts Per Month
Ex
pe
ct
ed
 J
oi
nt
 D
et
ec
tio
n 
Ti
m
e 
(H
ou
rs
)
p = 0.001 p = 0.005 p = 0.01
p = 0.05 p = 1
2 6
Fig. 2. Plots showing the expected joint detection time at diﬀerent levels of
clinician detection proﬁciency (p).
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Fig. 3. Plots showing the expected joint detection time as a function of the
number of cases (d) that are needed for clinicians to detect an outbreak.
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Fig. 1. Plots showing the detection performance of PANDA, an upper
bound on the expected detection performance of clinicians, and an upper
bound on the expected detection performance when PANDA is augment-
ing clinician detection (joint detection). Detection time is relative to the
ﬁrst simulated anthrax case who presented to the ED (= time zero).
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In this section we compare the results in the previous
section to selected results obtained by Buckeridge et al.
[8], who estimated detection performance of inhalational
anthrax based on a computer algorithm and clinical case
ﬁnding. In particular, they estimated how much less time
would be required for outbreak detection if a computer
algorithm were being applied to monitor emergency
department syndromic data. Their evaluation used models
of clinical case ﬁnding and of inhalational anthrax thatwere derived independently from those we derived and
described in Section 4. They also used a diﬀerent computer
detection algorithm and a diﬀerent set of actual ED cases
on which to inject simulated anthrax cases.
In particular, Buckeridge et al. reported that their model
of clinical case ﬁnding had an average detection time of 3.7
days after release. In Section 4.5, we reported an upper
bound on the expected clinician detection time as 62 h,
which is approximately 1.1 days faster than their model.
Buckeridge et al. deﬁne the detection time by clinical
case ﬁnding to be the duration between the release of
anthrax spores and the ﬁrst positive blood culture. In con-
trast, we ignore the incubation period and calculate the cli-
nician detection time as the time between the ﬁrst anthrax
case presenting to clinicians and the ﬁrst characteristic
signs on a chest X-ray or the ﬁrst positive blood culture.
Therefore, we do not consider the 1.1-day diﬀerence to be
surprising.
The computer augmentation time in detection, which is
called the detection beneﬁt in Buckeridge’s paper, is com-
puted as the diﬀerence in the timeliness between the com-
puter algorithm and clinical case ﬁnding. The
augmentation time is inﬂuenced by the false alert rates.
In particular, at a false alert rate of approximately 1 every
10 days, their mean computer augmentation time is 1 day
while our mean augmentation time is 1.7 days; at a false
alert rate of approximately 1 every 40 days, their mean
computer augmentation time is 0.32 days while our mean
augmentation time is 1.6 days.
The computer algorithm used by Buckeridge et al. dif-
fered from the one used here. In particular, they applied
a temporal detection algorithm based on cumulative sums
of residuals, whereas we applied a Bayesian spatio-tempo-
ral algorithm. Also, they used ICD9 diagnoses as the pri-
mary ED patient feature. We used chief complaints.
Buckeridge and colleagues developed a point estimate of
Table 1
Probability parameters used in the example in Section 4
day P(dt|day)
dt = 4 h dt = 48 h dt = never
1 0.000 0.011 0.989
2 0.000 0.011 0.989
3 0.000 0.012 0.988
4 0.000 0.013 0.987
5 0.001 0.014 0.985
6 0.003 0.034 0.963
7 0.010 0.054 0.936
8 0.032 0.123 0.845
9 0.060 0.172 0.768
10 0.094 0.206 0.700
11 0.150 0.260 0.589
12 0.212 0.314 0.474
13 0.267 0.339 0.394
14 0.338 0.359 0.303
15 0.406 0.361 0.233
16 0.495 0.350 0.155
17 0.592 0.318 0.090
18 0.643 0.292 0.065
19 0.670 0.278 0.053
20 0.680 0.272 0.048
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more conservative in our analysis and in part because the
clinical case ﬁnding model is not the main focus of this
paper. Given these diﬀerences, the diﬀering results that
are summarized in this section are not surprising.
6. Summary and future work
This paper introduced a general framework in the form
of an equation for estimating how well biosurveillance sys-
tems are expected to augment traditional clinical case ﬁnd-
ing in detecting an outbreak of a non-endemic infectious
disease. The method yields the expected joint detection
time (EJDT) of a computer-based biosurveillance system
that is working in parallel with traditional clinician out-
break detection. We presented the basic method at several
diﬀerent levels of generality. The general mathematical
framework that we introduced for evaluating joint clini-
cian-machine joint detection can be applied in evaluating
other types of joint clinician-machine detection, such as
the joint detection of nosocomial infectious disease
outbreaks.
We applied specialized versions of the method to an
example in order to derive an upper bound on joint out-
break detection of inhalational anthrax, and we performed
a sensitivity analysis. The example provides support that
the EJDT measure can be useful for assessing the extent
to which computer-based outbreak detection systems are
expected to augment traditional clinician outbreak
detection.
We also can use EJDT as a performance measure that
guides the development of outbreak detection algorithms
that complement the expected detection performance of cli-
nicians. It would be best to develop algorithms that are
augmentative of, rather than redundant with, clinician
detection. For example, for a given false alert level it might
be that computer algorithm A is expected to detect out-
break disease D earlier than algorithm B, but the EJDT
of B is less than A, because B better complements clinician
performance. If so, it would be best to use algorithm B.
This perspective suggests a new approach toward develop-
ing outbreak detection algorithms.
A primary direction for future research is to incorpo-
rate additional background information into the term K
in Eq. (1). Such information could include additional
clinical context about patient features, where those
patients are seen, and which clinicians see them. The spe-
ciﬁc formulation of Eq. (1) would then follow from the
particular form of K. It will be useful to perform exten-
sive evaluations of such extensions, using a variety of
computer algorithms, outbreak simulations, and simula-
tions of clinical case ﬁnding.
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Appendix .
Table 1 shows the probabilities that were used in the
example described in Section 4. These probabilities were
derived from a model developed by authors CA and
JND; the model is described in detail in [9], including
the literature used to estimate the model parameters.
According to the model, a patient with inhalational
anthrax, who presents with respiratory symptoms, would
be diagnosed either at 4 hours or less (by chest X-ray),
at 48 h or less (by blood culture), or never. The variable
dt (diagnosis time) in Table 1 represents the diagnosis
time relative to the day that the patient presented to the
ED. The variable day in Table 1 denotes the number of
days since a patient with inhalational anthrax became
exposed to (and presumptively infected by) an outdoor
point release of anthrax spores. As an example, if an
anthrax patient case presents to a clinician on the 5th
day after being infected, that case would have 0.1%
chance to be diagnosed with anthrax at up to 4 h after
presentation to the ED (by way of a chest X-ray), a
1.4% chance of being diagnosed at up to 48 h (by way
of a blood culture), and a 98.5% chance of not being diag-
nosed at all as having anthrax.
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